

VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS STAFF  
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

DATE 13 April 1972

TO: DDP, C/FE, [REDACTED]

FROM: GACarver, Jr.

SUBJECT:

REMARKS:

Attached are two memoranda on our [REDACTED] project: one sent by the Director to Dr. Kissinger and the other by me to General Vogt in his former capacity as Director of the Joint Staff. As you will see, it is basically the same memorandum modified for two different recipients. Please treat these as sensitive documents which should not be shown to any of your colleagues who do not have a bona fide need to see them.

[REDACTED]  
George A. Carver, Jr.

Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachments

TS No. 203072/72

TS No. 203073/72

CONFIDENTIAL

VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS STAFF

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

DATE: 7 April 1972

TO: Lt. General John W. Vogt, USAF  
Director

FROM: Joint Staff  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT:

REMARKS: John:

25X1 Attached is a resume of the work being done on the new [redacted] technique we have discussed over the phone.

As I told you, I was absolutely delighted when I heard you were getting your fourth star, though I was selfishly disappointed to learn that the billet involved would take your skill and expertise away from the Indochina problem. I was even more delighted to learn this morning that you are getting command of the 7th Air Force. Congratulations again. They could not have picked a better man for this crucial position. You know, I hope, that we stand ready to help you in any and every way we can.

25X1 [redacted]

George A. Carver, Jr.  
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment

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13 Apr 72

Major General William E. Evans, USAF  
Deputy DCS for Research & Development  
Headquarters, USAF

Attached is a copy of a 7 April memorandum I sent to then Lt. General Vogt in his former incarnation to bring him up to date on our joint developmental project. I thought you might be interested in having a copy of this memorandum and, hence, have asked Lt. Colonel Gentzel to take one to you.

Again, we all thank you very much for the cooperation and support we have received from your associates in this venture.

George A. Carver, Jr.  
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment  
TS No. 203072/72, Copy No. 5

7 APR 1972

Accused

1. It is ironic to find yourself of not having performed a task when, in fact, it has been so well discharged that your performance has demonstrably affected the actual course of events. Since the late Summer of 1971, we have been spotting and flagging the mounting signs of Hanoi's intention to essay large scale, main force military operations in several areas of Indochina. To be blunt, we have diagnosed Hanoi's evolving strategic intent as the various decisions were made, partly because our coverage is thorough and primarily because we have developed enough experience and expertise not only to know what to look for but also to spot immediately any behavior that is out of pattern or normal character.

2. Over the past half year plus, we spotted -- and, as events proved out, accurately interpreted -- signs or behavioral tip offs such as the following. In the summer of 1971 we noted that Hanoi was keeping its transportation units in the Laos Panhandle during the rains and, further, that these units were making unprecedented efforts to keep the route structure in a high state of repair, even though the roads were not they being utilized for any significant level of supply movement. This was promptly and correctly diagnosed as developing and maintaining a logistics infrastructure to support future large scale military activity. We also acquired and rightly interpreted evidence of increased Bloc aid to North Vietnam, including a sharp increase in orders for truck imports. We caught and flagged a sharply stepped up level of recruiting in North Vietnam, and the drafting of "undesirables" (e.g., Catholics and minority elements) who had heretofore been excluded from military service, plus a greater flexibility on age or physical requirements. It was obvious to us that Hanoi wanted more cannon fodder, and quickly.

3. We noted the high level of personnel infiltration during the Fall of 1971, a disproportionate amount of which was destined for (and went to) the B-3 Front. We observed in almost real time the slow start in the Fall logistics flow followed by steady movement carried out with a sense of manifest urgency and called a "crash program" by those participating. We saw Transportation Group 470 remain in the Panhandle to augment the

*For Director's PF/AB Briefing*

559th and then saw 470 spin off three major subordinates: 471, 472 and 473. We spotted and watched the resumption (after several years lapse) of major efforts to infiltrate supplies into lower South Vietnam by sea. We readily recognized that something big was afoot and said so, repeatedly.

4. As the Fall wore on, we spotted the North Vietnamese beavering away on new road construction in and through the DMZ, in the tri-border area, in South Vietnam's MR 2 and in Cambodia. We kept close tabs on these efforts and correctly diagnosed their import.

5. In the late Fall we flagged the movement of North Vietnamese troops to North Laos, spotted the 130mm field guns in route and signaled at once the imminence of a major effort in the area of the Plain of Jars. We watched Hanoi deploy the bulk of its strategic reserve and flagged these movements as they occurred -- the 320th division to the B-3 Front, the southward deployment of the 304th, 308th and 324 B and the steady build-up of supplies and troops in the immediate vicinity of the DMZ we also kept close tabs on, and reported, the buildup of Communist forces in Cambodia opposite South Vietnam's MR 3, the movements of the 5th, 7th and 9th divisions, the Phuoc Long Front (formerly the 1st NVA division), the 24th and 271st North Vietnamese independent regiments, the urgent formation of new VC/Khmer Communist units. We watched and reported as the supplies moved, the troops moved, and as the tanks and heavy artillery was brought up for Hanoi's planned attacks.

6. We also flagged the steady increase in Communist efforts to proselyte GVN military and civil officials. We noted and correctly analyzed captured documents referring to impending offensive activity. We stepped up agent collection and through well-placed sources in the Communist hierarchy got the texts or summaries of other documents, command briefings and attack plans.

7. In point of fact, we had the Communists so well pegged that we were able to check them in North Laos and make their early claims of total success there increasingly embarrassing. The attacks in South Vietnam they planned and wanted to launch around Tet and the President's Peking visit were smothered and never got off the ground. There was much bickering between Communist command echelons over these failures -- bickering into which we were well wired, the local and other forces who were supposed to mount these initial attacks complained querulously that they had been unable to achieve anything because the GVN and the Americans were too well warned, forearmed and ready.

8. Intelligence, in short, had Hanoi's movements and intentions spotted and plotted from square one. It contributed significantly to frustrating Hanoi's initial game plan to a degree that much of what Hanoi wanted to mount never came off -- and then allied intelligence was criticized for crying "wolf." We kept watch and reported as Hanoi juggled its scenario and then got criticized for Hanoi's acting on changes of plans we had helped force them to make by frustrating the Communists' original intentions. What we are really being criticized for is doing our job too well.